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LIMITS ON INTEREST RATES IN MARYLAND
By HAL M. SMITH*
In his recent article on Maryland zoning cases, Mr. Liebmann
suggests that the court of appeals is following a policy of judicial re-
straint, refraining from interfering with legislative decisions.' He
applauds the court's devotion to certainty in the law2 and its support
of legislative decisions. On the other hand, he seems to endorse the
generalization that "to express a preference for local (or in many
instances state) regulation of industries is to express a preference for
a measure of laissez-faire."' Recent decisions in the area of credit
charges and interest could be used to support either the judicial restraint
or the laissez-faire hypothesis. However, in accord with recognized
legal method and the teaching of Mr. Liebmann, the temptation to
"test" such over-simplified explanations of judicial behavior must be
resisted. The proper question, at least to a lawyer, is whether the de-
cisions are based on sense and reason, when tested against the discover-
able legislative policies and the current needs of commerce and society.
Maryland has had a general usury statute limiting interest to six
per cent since 1692.' Usurious loans were declared void, and a treble
forfeiture was imposed. However, since an 1845 revision of the statute,
the only effect of charging usury is that the excess interest above the
legal rate cannot be collected.5
Little can be said as to the reasonableness of the six per cent limit
when enacted. Homer summarizes the lack of evidence as follows:
The extreme scarcity of specie led to many expedients, but
not to a record of very high interest rates. High rates no doubt
existed in commercial and personal transactions. But high in-
terest rates were vigorously opposed by colonial law and custom
and were therefore negotiated secretly and have not come down
to us. Many very high rates will be reported from the Western
frontier and from nineteenth century money markets, but few
from the colonial period.6
Expedients to avoid usury limitations are undoubtedly still utilized.'
On the sale of goods or real estate on credit, the true interest rate can
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
1. Liebmann, Maryland Zoning - The Court And Its Critics, 27 MD. L. Rev.
39, 52 (1967).
2. Id. at 48.
3. Id. at 44.
4. Ch. 75, [1692] Laws of Maryland, as set forth in Archives of Md., Proceed-
ings and Acts of the General Assembly of Md., 1684-1692 (1894) at 540. On loans
payable in commodities, the limit was eight per cent per annum. The general limit is
found in MD. CODE ANN. art. 49, §§ 1, IA, 3 (1964 repl. vol.). § 3 being a fairly direct
descendant of the 1692 statute.
5. Ch. 352, § 4, [1845] Laws of Maryland, now codified as MD. CODE ANN.
art. 49, §§ 4, 5 (1964 repl. vol.). Moreover, once a debt plus usurious interest is fully
paid, the usurious interest cannot be recovered. Mn. CODE ANN. art. 49, § 5 (1964
repl. vol.).
6. S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 275 (1963).
7. See Hershman, Usury and the Tight Money Market, 22 Bus. LAW. 333
(1967); Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes,
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often be hidden by simply charging more, and effective limitation by
law may not even be possible. Over the past three centuries, prime
interest rates have typically been well below six per cent, although not
always, and possibly the six per cent limit was fairly workable at
most times.' When the bankers of Maryland obtained special relief
allowing discounting in 1827, 9 they perhaps could also have obtained
an increase in the rate if the statutory six per cent was so low that
many needy farmers were unable to obtain loans."0
The pattern in this century has been to regulate particular types
of loans by particular statutes." In addition to Article 49, which con-
tains the general provisions as to usury, Maryland now has nine dif-
ferent statutory limits on interest rates or credit 'charges. These
statutes will be mentioned individually later, and the rates which can
be charged under them are summarized in the table at the conclusion
of this article. This legislative accumulation leaves many areas un-
regulated and many unanswered questions. It certainly prevents some
high risk borrowers from obtaining loans through legal channels, as
would any usury statute. As the prime interest rate rose to six per
cent in 1966, the number who could not borrow at legal rates increased,
and the need for relaxation of the usual six per cent legal limit became
greater. The need to protect the borrower also continues, and passage
of the federal Truth in Lending Act, requiring a lender to clearly
state the true interest rate being charged, seems likely this year.
1 2
The Federal Trade Commission has proposed standards of disclosure
in retail credit. 3 The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws is preparing comprehensive consumer protection
legislation.'4 On the other hand, in a recent article in this Review
it was suggested that the general statutory limit be set on a flexible
basis and that there be no interest ceiling on loans of not less than
$10,000 made to allow the borrower to carry on or acquire a busi-
ness. 5 Pending further legislation to clarify and improve the regu-
53 VA. L. REv. 327, 332-33 (1967) ; Comment, Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities and
New York's Usury Statute, 66 COLUIm. L. REv. 167 (1966).
8. See S. HOMER, A HiSTORY OF INTEREST RATs (1963), chs. XVI, XVII.
9. Ch. 99, [1826] Laws of Maryland.
10. For a study demonstrating the various factors influencing political decisions
on usury, including whether prices are rising or falling, see Friedman, The Usury
Laws of Wisconsin: A Study in Legal and Social History, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 515.
11. Maryland was one of the first states to adopt small loan regulation. Ch. 836,[1912] Laws of Maryland 1621. This was replaced by the Uniform Small Loan Act
in 1918. Ch. 88, [1918] Laws of Maryland 197, now found as MD. ConE ANN. art. 58A
(1964 repl. vol.).
12. The Truth in Lending Act, S. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), has been passed
by the Senate and is pending before the House.
13. Proposed Guides Relating to Retail Credit Transactions, Dec. 24, 1966.
14. The Second Tentative Draft was discussed at the Conference's annual meeting
last summer. The proposal is to cover in one code regulation of credit sales, revolving
credit, credit cards, small loans and credit insurance. See Jordan & Warren, A
Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 441 (1967).
15. Merriman & Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in Light of a Tight
Money Market, 27 MD. L. Rnv. 1 (1967). A recent move in this direction is con-
sidered in a Note, Usury - An Analysis of Usury Legislation and the Mississippi
Corporate Exception Statute, 38 Miss. L. Rsv. 347 (1967). Like Mississippi, New
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lation of interest in Maryland, the court must accommodate the
individual desire to borrow at whatever interest rate can be obtained
in the market with the legislative policy of protecting powerless1" or
possibly unwary borrowers from excessive interest charges. As a col-
lateral benefit, a study of the response of the Maryland Court of Appeals
to this conflict demonstrates the creative common law judicial process.
The consumer credit industry usually quotes interest rates on the
basis of advance calculation on the'original ari-unt -loaned, with a six
per cent rate yielding an actuarial interest of about -e-leven,-per cent.
The pending federal Truth in Lending Act would change; this by
requiring the lender to disclose both the total dollar credit- charges
and the "nominal annual rate determined -by the actuarial method
(United States rule)."7 What is known as the United States rule
for computing interest wvAs stated in Story v. Livingston:'8
The correct rule, in general, is, that the creditor shall calcu-
late interest, whenever a payment is made. To this interest, the
payment is first to be applied; and if it exceed the interest due,
the balance is to be applied to diminish the principal. If the pay-
ment fall short of the interest, the balance of interest is not to be
added to the principal so as to produce interest.
Interest rates computed by this method will occasionally be referred
to as true or real interest rates.
THE RECENT MARYLAND DECISIONS
In 1966 and 1967, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided three
important cases affecting interest rates. In Falcone v. Palmer Ford,
Inc., 9 the court decided that the credit charge rates fixed in the Retail
Installment Sales Act2" for the sale of automobiles could be calculated
in advance rather than on the declining balance due over the term of
the extension of credit, thus allowing a true rate of about sixteen to
twenty-seven per cent per year. In Rothman v. Silver,2 the court
decided that a "promise to pay $9,072 of deferred purchase price and
$2,177.28 of interest thereon" in equal installments over a four-year
period was an agreement to pay only a credit price and not an agree-
ment to pay any interest, so that the usury law was not applicable.
In Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Cohen,2 2 it decided that it was not
usurious both to compute interest in advance on the nominal amount
of an installment loan at the maximum rate and to deduct the interest
York now has at least some interest limit on loans to corporations (25%). N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 2401 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
16. In Carozza v. Fed. Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 249, 131 A. 332, 342
(1925), the court said: "There is general recognition that laws against usury sprang
from the notion that the needy and driven borrower was, by reason of his unfortunate
circumstances, subject to the domination of the lender, with disastrous pecuniary loss
ard personal hardship."
17. S. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(f) (1) (1967).
18. 38 U.S. 359, 370 (1839).
-19. 242 Md. 487, 219 A.2d 808 (1966).
20. MD. CODE ANN. art. 83, §§ 128-53 (1965 repl. vol.).
21. 245 Md. 292, 294, 226 A.2d 308, 310 (1967).
22. 245 Md. 639, 227 A.2d 8 (1967).
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so computed from the nominal principal amount to determine the
amount actually to be advanced to the borrower.
Prior to these decisions, it was not clear in Maryland that credit
sellers of automobiles could charge the statutory rates of interest for
the whole term of the loan on the initial balance due. Moreover, it
was not settled that credit sellers of goods other than motor vehicles
could charge more than the general statutory rate of six per cent,
whether computed in advance or in real interest terms on the declining
balance.23 And despite the dicta in two 1958 cases,24 it was not finally
settled that the seller of an automobile worth more than $2,000 was
limited only by the rates in the Retail Installment Sales Act rather
than the general statutory rate of six per cent.
The Retail Installment Sales Act until 1965 defined "goods" as
"all chattels personal having a cash price of two thousand dollars or
less."2 5 The amount was raised to $5,000 in 1965. "Installment sale
agreement" is defined as "any contract for the retail sale of goods ..
Section 132 of the Act provides:
(a) Time balance may include finance and insurance charges.
The time balance in an installment sale agreement for a motor
vehicle may include a finance charge....
(b) Maximum finance charge. - The finance charge imposed on
the sales of a motor vehicle shall not exceed [certain rates] .21
Returning to definitions, we find also that " 'Finance charge' means
the amount in excess of the cash price of the goods sold . . . to be
paid by the buyer for the privilege of purchasing the goods under the
installment sale agreement. "28
Once it is assumed that the Act applies, the Falcone decision
follows necessarily from the words of the Act. Section 132 prescribes
the rates chargeable "on the principal balance." Principal balance is
clearly defined to mean the balance due at the beginning, as required
to be entered on the sales contract. 29 But the assumption that all credit
sales of automobiles are regulated by a statute which only regulates
sales up to a certain amount of money is questionable. The original
Act, passed in 1941,30 has a stated purpose of "regulating certain in-
stallment sales and installment sale agreements." It did not have a pur-
pose of regulating credit sales above the stated dollar amount or where
no security is retained by the seller, for these transactions were not
within the limiting definitions. The 1954 amendment31 did have a title
indicating regulation of credit charges on all automobile sales, but
23. In 1963, the time price doctrine was approved by the Attorney General even
as to certain revolving credit arrangements. 48 MD. A'yrv" GEN. Ops. 260 (1963).
24. Nuttall v. Baker, 217 Md. 454, 456, 143 A.2d 500, 501 (1958) ; Automobile
Acceptance Corp. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 216 Md. 344, 354, 139 A.2d 683,
688 (1958).
25. MD. CODE ANN. art. 83, § 152 (1957).
26. MD. COD ANN. art. 83, § 152(b) (1965 repl. vol.).
27. MD. CODS ANN. art. 83, § 132 (1965 repl. vol.).
28. MD. CODE ANN. art. 83, § 152(m) (1965 repl. vol.) (emphasis added).
29. MD. CODg ANN. art. 83, §§ 152(a), 129(a) (1965 repl. vol.).
30. Ch. 851, [1941] Laws of Maryland 1501.
31. Ch. 80, [1954] Laws of Maryland 258.
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vague titling is not controlling and the reference to "installment sale
agreement" in section 1 3 2 (a) could well have been held to limit
its application.
Why did the auto dealers accept the earlier dicta without a day in
court? It had not been settled whether the six per cent statute applied
to credit sales, including sales of automobiles, for more than $2,000
($5,000). Undoubtedly the auto industry was content with a definite
and liberal limit of nine to fifteen per cent or, if the credit could be
computed in advance, of about sixteen to twenty-seven per cent, rather
than facing the possibility of a limit of six per cent or, if computation
in advance was allowable, of about eleven per cent. The Rothman case,
which established the time-price doctrine in Maryland, was not decided
until 1967. And few would have dreamed of the freedom of the
Crest case.
Rothman v. Silver could have been decided by allowing interest
to be charged in advance under the general usury statute. The seller
of a taxicab and franchise had added six per cent of the balance due
on the agreed cash price to compute the installments due under the
note and mortgage, thus collecting credit charges on the declining
balance of more than eleven per cent. However, the court chose to
validate the deal by opting for an extreme version of the time-price
doctrine. The time-price doctrine essentially provides that if a seller
charges more for goods sold on credit than he would if he had sold
them for cash, he is merely charging a time-price for the goods and is
not charging interest. The Maryland court was undoubtedly right in
stating that the great weight of authorities validated a bona fide time-
price "even though the price on credit is arrived at by adding a per cent
to the cash price in excess of the legal rate of interest or is stated as a
rate of interest."3 2 But the "Agreement of Sale" in question was for the
sale of "the taxicab and the franchise for $2,000 in cash and a balance
of $9,072 'to be secured by a Purchase Money Chattel Mortgage and
a Confessed Judgment Note, both of which shall provide for the pay-
ment of said balance, plus interest at six per cent'. . . ., Both the
mortgage and the note were also phrased in terms of a price of $9,072
plus interest. It is submitted that the court of appeals could have
decided that there was at least a question of fact as to whether there
was a bona fide time-price,3 4 rather than concluding that Rothman
32. 245 Md. at 298, 226 A.2d at 311-12. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967).
The court's suggestion that such is the rule in "some forty-six states" must be viewed
as a clerical error, for only forty-six states have general usury statutes. Comment,
Limiting Consumer Credit Charges by Reinterpretation of General Usury Laws and
by Separate Regulation, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 303 (1960).
33. 245 Md. at 215, 226 A.2d at 310.
34. See Raben v. Overseas Barters, Inc., 36 U.S.L.W. 2107 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1124-36 (1967). The writer of a Note, Judicial
and Legislative Treatment of "Usurious" Credit Sales, 71 HARV. L. Rgv. 1143, 1145
(1958), stated:
The chief requisite of this doctrine is that the credit price - the "bona fide
time price" - be stated as a total price specifically agreed upon by the parties
as complete payment rather than a sum arrived at by adding various charges to
the cash price, the periodic payments then being computed on the basis of a total
price which is never revealed.
In Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 229 A.2d 712 (Md. 1967), the parties had
agreed upon a contract price of $3200, of which $2160 was to repay another in-
256 [VOL. XXVII
LIMITS ON INTEREST RATES IN MARYLAND
was entitled to payment in full of all installments provided in the note.
Moreover, one primary foundation of the time-price cases has been
that the state's general usury statute applies only to the forbearance of
money, not goods." In Maryland, Section 3 of Article 49 expressly
covers a loan of goods or chattels. Of course, our legal thinking permits
the court to say that a sale is not a loan, if policy so demands.
The facts in the Crest case were not in dispute, the case having
been disposed of on motions for summary judgment. The Crest loan
was characterized by the court of appeals as follows:
Cohen needed $10,000 to buy a taxicab and the Public Service
Commission permit authorizing its use. Crest loaned him the
money. . . . Crest had him sign a $14,500 note which required
261 successive weekly payments of $55 and a final payment
of $145.00.36
Although the court of appeals focused on the final form of the note,
the trial court seemed more interested in the substance of the trans-
action. Judge Harris found the following:
The undisputed facts in this case show that . . . the com-
plainant ... purchased a taxicab, together with the Public Service
Commission permit applicable thereto, for a price of $10,000;
that he borrowed the sum of $10,000 from the respondent . . . in
payment therefor; that he was given a settlement sheet ... which
disclosed that a purchase price mortgage loan was obtained from
Crest in the total sum of $14,500, and the $10,000 paid for the
taxicab. There is no reference in the settlement sheet to any
charge made for an insurance premium."7
When Cohen failed to pass the necessary medical examination, $500
was refunded to him, representing the cost of credit life insurance
which Crest had intended to obtain. The note was secured by a chattel
mortgage of the taxi and permit, by a mortgage of two parcels of
improved real estate, and by a partial guarantee of the note by the
Checker Cab Company.
The issue, as seen by the court of appeals, was whether Crest
could "charge, as it did here, 13.46 per cent interest." Crest's theory,
stallment loan owed by the borrower, about $500 represented the cost of certain home
improvements, and the remainder was understood to be finance and insurance charges.
After the contract for $3200 was signed, the creditor got the debtor to sign a note
and mortgage in the amount of $6,399.60. The case chiefly turned on a finding of
fraud, but the court did say that the difference between the $3200 agreed price and
the $6,399.60 was interest and was usurious. 229 A.2d at 713. If the original con-
tract had called for the signing of a note with additional finance charges, so the
transaction could be said to be "integrated" as in Rothman, the Rothman case perhaps
would require the conclusion that there was no usury under its broad phrasing of the
time-price doctrine. The Williams case did hold, on a minor issue, that the $3200
contract was not usurious under the time price doctrine. The court placed the burden
of proof on the borrower as follows: "There was no evidence to show that $3200
did not include a 'time-price' for home improvements .. " 229 A.2d at 717.
35. E.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262
S.W. 425 (1924).
36. 245 Md. at 640-41, 227 A.2d at 9.
37. Brief for Appellant at E.2, Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Cohen, 245 Md. 639,
227 A.2d 8 (1967).
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accepted by the court, was that the loan was really of $14,500, not
$10,000 or $10,500, and the interest charged on this amount exceeded
by only $12.50 a rate of five and one-half per cent per annum in
advance. Cohen contended that the $4,500 charge on a loan of $10,000
was based on an interest rate of nine per cent per annum "add-on;"
or considering the refund of $500, constituted an "add-on" rate of 7.6
plus per cent. As all agreed that the applicable limit was six per cent,
the allowable method of computing the interest became the crucial issue.
Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals seemed to think that
the factual question of how the interest charge had in fact been com-
puted or agreed upon was very important.
Cohen's amended complaint sought relief from all interest over
that due on a loan of $10,000 on a direct reduction basis, that is, com-
puted from week to week on the declining balance due. This method
would have allowed interest of about $1200.8 The trial court accepted
this method, modifying the requested relief only to the extent of
treating the $500 refund as additional principal loaned. The court of
appeals held that the maximum allowable interest on a five year loan
is thirty per cent of the sum of the principal and interest, that is, that
the discount method can be used along with the computation in
advance. Thus on a five year loan of $10,500, a Maryland lender is
allowed to charge $4,500 interest, not just the $3,150 chargeable
under the add-on or computation in advance method. As pointed out
in appellee's brief,3 9 this allows a real interest rate of 15.04 per cent.
As it would seem that the court of appeals also held that an additional
charge of two per cent for investigation can be made, this would raise
the allowable true interest rate on a five year loan to about 16.5 per
cent. Under the advance and discount method now allowed, a ten
year true loan of $760 would be represented by a note for $2000 (60%
interest and 2% investigation fee), the borrower paying about twenty-
four per cent a year interest.
The 1963 amendment 40 to the general usury statute clearly allows
the add-on, or computation in advance, method of computing interest
except where the loan is secured by a mortgage on real estate. Since
the six per cent statutory rate was unrealistic even in 1962, there
could be no quarrel with a decision that the add-on method, allowing
somewhat less than twelve per cent true interest, could and should
have been permitted under the pre-1963 interest statute. The twelve
per cent would remain as a uniform limit, regardless of the term of
the loan. The argument used by the court to get beyond this twelve
per cent limit is a disturbing tribute to the flexibility of our legal rules.
The argument of appellant Crest which was accepted by the court
of appeals was that a computation by an advance-discount method was
38. At $55 a week the loan would have been fully repaid in less than four years.
The plaintiff in his amended complaint sought to be relieved of all interest charges
in excess of $1,100 on the basis of his declining balance computation and his having
tendered payment in full before the end of the five year term.
39. Brief for Appellee at 9, Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Cohen, 245 Md. 639, 227
A.2d 8 (1967).
40. Ch. 871, [1963] Laws of Maryland 2014, appearing as MD. CODM ANN. art. 49,
§ IA (1964 repl. vol.).
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allowed by Section 22 of Article 58A of the Maryland Code which
provides :"'
This Article shall not apply to any person, copartnership or
corporation doing business under any law of this State, or of the
United States, relating to banks, trust companies or building and
loan associations, or to companies or corporations making loans
at a rate of interest not exceeding 6% per annum, on the principal
amount of the loan, in advance, charging an investigation fee not
exceeding four (4%) per cent of the amount of the loan, or loans
of three hundred dollars ($300) or less and charging a fee of
not exceeding 2% on amount above three hundred dollars ($300)
which companies, persons or corporations may require the bor-
rower to give as security for such loan, mortgage on real or
personal property, or to purchase certificates of investment . . .
and to pay therefor in equal weekly or monthly installments
covering approximately the period of the loan....
A natural reading of this statute is that it specifies certain persons
who are not subject to "this Article," that is, the Uniform Small Loan
Law.42 But this reading would not give effect to the language as to
investigation fees on loans for more than $300. The small loans act
only regulates persons in the business of making loans up to $300, so
it is arguable that section 22 constitutes an affirmative grant of au-
thority rather than merely an exemption from the Article. The au-
thorization of Morris plan loans4" by this section is further evidence
that an affirmative grant of power was intended.
The opinion of the court of appeals reads more like the decision
of a court in a civil law jurisdiction than one in the Anglo-American
tradition.4 A 1957 opinion of the Attorney General4 5 is quoted at
length, omitting the factual problem being discussed by the Attorney
General, and the language is adopted as the proper reading of the
statute. The usual bridge to legislative intent is made by saying :"
However marginal the views of the Attorney General may
have been in March 1957, it must be conceded that subsequent
41. MD. CODE ANN. art. 58A, § 22 (1964 repl. vol.).
42. This section can be read as exempting banks, regardless of the interest they
charge, as is done in the Act regulating Industrial Finance Companies, MD. CODE ANN.
art. 11, § 166 (1957).
43. See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 52-53 (1965),
for a description of the practice of requiring purchase of investment certificates as a
means of increasing the true interest rate. A statute authorizing this method of
charging interest on the initial amount of an installment loan was held to conflict with
a constitutional usury provision in Community Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. State, 343
S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1961). The offended constitutional provision was amended in 1960.
TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11 (1876), as amended.
44. Professor Schlesinger states:
A civilian often displays a lack of interest in the precise facts of the former
case on which he relies .... The abstract proposition which can be distilled from
a precedent or a line of precedents is more likely to impress itself on a civilian's
memory than the factual setting in which that proposition was applied. R.
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 313 (2d ed. 1959).
45. 42 MD. AT'Y GEN. Ops. 68 (1957).
46. 245 Md. at 647-48, 227 A.2d at 13,
19671
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events, or the lack thereof, have enhanced their validity. The
Legislature has since met, in either regular or special session,
seventeen times and is presently in regular session. It cannot be
supposed that the published opinion of the Attorney General ren-
dered to such an important state agency in respect of a business
practice in which so many citizens have an interest, can have
escaped the notice of the Legislature. Indeed, standing alone the
passage of Chap. 871 of the Laws of 1963, Code, Art. 49, § IA
(Repl. Vol. 1964), would suggest that the Legislature took a hard
look at the practice of charging or deducting interest in advance.
The court then goes on to dismiss some contrary legislative history
as to computing interest in advance on the sole authority of the opinion
of the Attorney General.
The question before the Attorney General was the validity of the
following procedure :17
This procedure is to calculate 6% per annum (illustration
with a $100.00 loan), $6.00, and to add it to the loan ($6.00 plus
$100.00), $106.00 being the amount of the note taken. $100
is given borrower. This is then made payable in twelve install-
ments, one due in each of the next successive twelve months ...
The Attorney General recognized that Section 22 does not contain
a clear affirmative grant of power. However, he found some support
for such a reading in the titles of acts amending the section. He then
cited general authorities on long established administrative practice
and concluded :48
Similarly, the Legislature, following the passage of the origi-
nal Act in 1918, undoubtedly had knowledge of the fact that banks
and other institutions employed the discouint procedure under
discussion, and in 1939 even inserted the words "in advance" to
describe the procedure accurately. In our opinion there is no im-
pelling reason to depart from a construction of the said Section 22
which has been accepted for many years by your Department and
concurred in by the Maryland Legislature.
We, therefore, conclude that Section 22 of Article 58A
exempts from the application of the usury laws the practice in
question of discounting 6% interest per annum in advance and
requiring the borrower to repay the principal amount of the loan
in equal weekly or monthly installments.
Although the Attorney General used the words "discounting 6% in-
terest per annum in advance," he was talking about advancing $100
and charging $6 per year interest. Had the discussion been of dis-
counting in the sense used by Crest in justifying its charges to Cohen,
then the interest charged would have been about $6.38 on a loan of
$106.38, with $100 being advanced.
47. 42 MD. ATT'y G N. Ops. 68 (1957).
48. Id. at 75.
[VOL. XXVII
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The use of the word "discounting" by the Attorney General was
inaccurate, inapplicable to the facts being considered, and apparently
inadvertant. Its use by the court of appeals was not inadvertant, for
the Appellant's brief devoted more than five of its thirteen pages of
argument to the issue: "Do the words IN ADVANCE as used in Article
58A Section 22 permit the DISCOUNTING of all interest charged on a
term loan at the inception of the loan where the loan is paid back in
equal periodic installments ?"'9 One cannot argue with Appellant's
position, supported by a multitude of quotations, that a discount is
interest taken in advance from the agreed principal amount. Of course,
that is not what Crest did. All agreed that Cohen wanted and got a
loan of $10,000 (at $10,500), not $14,500. Nor do general quotations
of commercial meaning of terms determine how a statute such as Sec-
tion 22 using the term "principal amount of the loan" is to be read.
On a fifteen year loan of $100 at six per cent, the interest in advance
is $90. If the borrower is given only $10 but signs a note for $100,
the principal amount can be said to be $100 only by a technical reliance
on language contrary to accepted legal method requiring a considera-
tion of substance, context, and policy.
It can be urged that no ambiguous usury statute should be con-
strued to allow both computation of interest in advance and discount-
ing because the limit on the real interest rate becomes very high, the
interest rate used in selling the loan and calculating the deal may be
deceptive, and the limit varies with the term of the loan. To illustrate
only the deception point, a person who borrows $2,000 for three years
at 4.5 per cent interest may find himself paying on the advance-discount
basis or on the slightly less burdensome double add-on basis. Under
the double add-on system, the bank would first add on 13.5 per cent
(4.5 times 3 years) of the $2,000, or $270; then it would add on 13.5
per cent of the $270, giving a total due of $2,306.45. The true interest
rate would be nearly ten per cent, but the customer is told he is getting
a 4.5 per cent loan.
The 1957 opinion of the Attorney General was concerned with
the computation of interest in advance on installment loans, not with
discounting. He found that advance computation at six per cent was
usurious under Article 49,0 but not under § 22 of Article 58A. Citing
court of appeals' decisions in which it was stated that Article 49 could
not be avoided by any subterfuge, he assumed that the true interest
rate was the rate intended by Article 49. This conclusion is in line
with the authority in other states interpreting general usury statutes. 51
No Maryland cases have been found, prior to Rothman and Crest,
where the issue of computation of interest in advance on installment
loans was contested.
On the issue of discounting, however, there is considerable au-
thority that the maximum interest chargeable is determined by applying
49. Brief for Appellant at 5, Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Cohen, 245 Md. 639, 227
A.2d 8 (1967).
50. He concluded it was usurious under § 3 of art. 49, which further shows thathe was not concerned with discounting in the usual sense, as to which the § 1 language
"charge or deduct" would have been important.
51. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 630, 663-67 (1958).
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the legal rate to the actual amount advanced. In the 1882 case of
Montague v. Sewell,52 a loan was disguised as a sale by the borrower
of his interest in real estate, the lender leasing the ground rent back
with an option to repurchase. The borrower wanted $30,000 and was
willing to pay up to 6.5 per cent interest. The lender advanced the
$30,000, but the papers were drawn on the basis of a sale with lease-
back and a repurchase option at $31,500. The annual rent was fixed
at six per cent of the $31,500, as to which the court said, "rent was
required to be paid in respect to $1,500 of the price of the ground rent
that had never been received by the parties selling it." The court con-
cluded that all amounts above six per cent for ten years calculated on
the actual loan of $30,000 were usurious." Since Crest was expressly
based on statutory language first appearing in 1939, it cannot tech-
nically be said that Crest has overruled Montague. But it is reasonably
clear that the Crest holding applied to the Montague facts would indi-
cate that the total obligation undertaken by the borrower was the
$31,500 option price plus the ten years rent of $18,900, a total of
$50,400; since six per cent interest is allowed over the ten years, the
lender could have advanced as little as $20,160 without being guilty
of usury.
The Crest case is distinguishable from Montague in that in Crest
the note for $14,500 did not bear interest. Discounting of short term,
single payment loans is clearly valid under the prior decisions. 4 But
it is doubtful that this principle should have been applied to the facts
of Crest, where Cohen wanted a loan of $10,000, not $14,500, for a
long term. There is nothing in the Crest record indicating what
interest rate Cohen thought he was paying. Under the Montague
decision, if a borrower asks for a loan of $100 for three years, and
the lender agrees to advance him $100 at six per cent interest, and
$100 is actually advanced, then the loan is for $100, and the maximum
interest which can be charged is $18. Neither the double add-on method
producing an interest of $21.24 nor the advance-discount method pro-
ducing an interest of $22 would have been proper, even though the
final note is for the combined principal and interest.
Where the negotiations are for a $100 loan for three years at six
per cent, but only $82 is advanced to the borrower, there would be a
true discount. Perhaps if the parties really agree to a discount basis of
charging the interest and the borrower still goes through with the
deal even after he sees how little he is getting, then the discount method
52. 57 Md. 407 (1882).
53. The same result was reached in Gaither v. Clarke, 67 Md. 18, 31-32 (1887).
See also Brenner v. Plitt, 182 Md. 348, 351, 34 A.2d 853, 855 (1943), where the court
suggests that the interest is to be computed on the amount actually advanced against
a mortgage bearing 6% interest payable in installments. Andrews v. Poe, 30 Md. 485
(1869) and Real Estate Trustee v. Lentz, 153 Md. 624, 139 A. 351 (1927) arrived
at a contrary result, allowing interest on the face amount, but apparently without the
issue having been contested. On the other hand, the court in these last two cases did
not engage in a computation of the interest in advance to try to validate part or all of
the bonus or discount. The parties intended 6% on the declining balances and the
lender was stuck with that method.
54. Duncan v. Maryland Savings Institution, 10 Gill & J. 299 (Md. 1838). See
Penrose v. Canton Nat'l Bank, 147 Md. 200, 127 A. 852 (1925).
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should be allowed. The practical problems of selling a loan should
provide a barrier against gross abuse in this area. Thus if a borrower
understood that the bank was loaning him $1,000 for ten years but at
closing was told that he would actually receive only $400, he would
probably back out of the deal. A more certain solution would have
been to decide that the reference to Rowlett's Tables in Section 1 of
Article 49 meant that that section was limited to loans for two years
or less. 5 As to longer loans, Section 3 of Article 49 should be applied.
Section 3 is the descendant of the original 1704 usury statute and,
although amended by Section 1, continues in the Code and should
perhaps be given some meaning. The ancient definition of allowable
interest in Section 3 is the exacting one of "the value of six dollars for
the forebearance of one hundred dollars for one year." Under this
language there would be little doubt that the relevant amount is the
amount actually "foreborne," i.e., advanced to the borrower. In any
event, the fact that the court relied on Section 22 of Article 58A, which
only speaks of "making loans at a rate of interest not exceeding six
per cent per annum, on the principal amount of the loan, in advance"
and does not even use the language of Section 1 of Article 49, "charge
or deduct," requires the conclusion that the court was making law in
the Crest case, not just applying it. 6
Despite the weaknesses in the court's reasoning, it is difficult to
say that the decision was wrong. If legitimate commercial needs de-
mand an interest rate of more than twelve per cent per annum, then
the Crest holding may be viewed as being in the grand tradition of
55. J. ROWLETT'S TABLES or DISCOUNT, OR INTEREST (1802), set forth the
interest on amounts from $1 to $5,000 at 6% for times from one day to twenty-four
months. It contains no suggestion as to whether discounting or computation in
advance is allowable except from the use of the words discount and interest inter-
changeably. See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 842, 850 (1954), for cases indicating that
RowLXT''s TABLES permit using a 360 day year as a basis for calculating interest.
Although there are cases limiting discounting to short term loans, Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d
630, 637, 640 (1956), no such case has been found which relies on RowLT'r's TABLES
to reach the result.
56. In Agostini v. Colonial Trust Co., 28 Del. Ch. 39, 36 A.2d 33 (1944), a
different conclusion was reached under a Small Loan Act which provided: "Any such
lender may charge in advance the legal rate of interest of six per cent upon the entire
amount of the loan and may make such loan [repayable in installments]." 36 A.2d
at 37. The court concluded that this provision should be interpreted as adopting the
prior law as to general usury statutes, which permitted discounting only for short
term loans. It said, at 37-38:
There is no express limitation of the period for which interest may be thus
charged in advance. However, it is clear that unless the period be restricted, the
actual rate of interest would be shockingly high in cases of loans for relatively
long terms. . . . Such a construction would defeat one of the purposes of the
statute, which is to restrict the rate of interest chargeable upon loans permitted
by the act.
It further said, at 39, "This construction by no means renders the provision super-
fluous. In view of the authorization to make loans repayable in installments, there is
grave doubt that advance collections of interest computed on the entire amount of a
loan would be permissible unless expressly authorized." But see a later opinion,
Agostini v. Colonial Trust Co., 28 Del. Ch. 360, 44 A.2d 21 (1945), suggesting that
proof of a contrary banking custom would have required a contrary result. In Allen
v. Dunn, 71 Neb. 831, 99 N.W. 680, 681 (1904), a statute providing that "such rate
of interest, when agreed upon, may be taken yearly or for any shorter period, or in
advance, if so expressly agreed" was held to mean that "the taking of interest for
more than one year in advance is unauthorized, if by such action more than 10%
interest is received."
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common law judging. It is not certain that the holding is contrary to
legislative intent, especially since legislative intent can properly be re-
interpreted in the light of modern high interest rates and the great
increase in the number of possible sources of credit. 7 No definitive
answer can be given as to what are reasonable interest charges. The
factual settings are too varied. A nearly insolvent businessman may
reasonably agree to pay fifty per cent a year interest for that small
amount of capital which he needs to give his business another chance
to survive. On the other hand, the Maryland legislature seems to have
declared as to real estate loans that the true or actuarial interest rate
should not exceed about six per cent. Appellee's brief in Crest pointed
out that the advance-discount method would allow rates ranging from
11.58 per cent on a one-year loan to 22.24 per cent on a ten year loan.
58
Adding in the investigation fees which are allowed under Section 22
of Article 58A, the general usury limit in Maryland is now approxi-
mately sixteen per cent per year for one year and twenty-four per cent
per year for ten years.
In the absence of statutory distinction between highly secured and
unsecured loans, or between high expense, small loans and relatively
expense-free, large loans, the Maryland court had to interpret the
statutes so as to fix an interest limit applicable to all types of loans
not otherwise regulated. In this context, statutes in other states regulat-
ing consumer loans are material evidence of what business and society
consider to be reasonable interest rates. A large number of states have
statutes limiting the credit charges which may be made in connection
with the sale of a motor vehicle. A somewhat smaller number have
limits on credit charges in the sale of other types of goods for personal,
family or household purposes, with some including the rendering of
services on credit and home repairs or improvements. These statutes
have been summarized by Curran in her report on the American Bar
Foundation study of consumer credit regulation.59 From that sum-
mary it appears to be the consensus of the various state legislatures
that true interest rates in the range from fourteen per cent to twenty-
five per cent per annum, depending upon the age of the vehicle or the
amount of money involved, are reasonable. The usual rate allowed in
the non-automobile statutes on credit in excess of $1,000 is sixteen
per cent per year, and an allowable rate of twenty per cent on such
amount is not uncommon. Assuming that few advance-discount in-
stallment loans will be made for more than five years, the seventeen
per cent allowed by the Crest decision on a five year loan is within
57. No authority need be cited for the basic proposition that our case law grows
and changes to meet changing circumstances. Llewellyn concluded in 1959:
Nor have I found any court which, judged on a sequence of cases, is not moving
with regard to statutes about as freely in the average as it is in the case-law
field .... What you get in the statutory field is a jerkier, less predictable move-
ment: here more of a hitch, there a sudden jump, so to speak, under cover; with
no adequate guidance, as to when which will occur. That is not healthy judging.
K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENcE, REALISM IN TiiEORY AND PRACTIcE 227 (1962).
58. Brief for Appellee at 9, Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Cohen, 245 Md. 639, 227
A.2d 8 (1967).
59. B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 254-77 (1965)
(Charts 11, 12, 13).
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the range fixed in other states and in this state. Recent Maryland
legislation allows about twenty-two per cent per year in credit charges
on the installment sale of consumer goods at a price of $1,000 or less
and about twenty per cent on credit sales for $2,000.60
Further support for the reasonableness of interest rates in the
range from fifteen to twenty-five per cent per year is found in a recent
study of the consumer finance industry. 61 Nine major companies were
included in the study. The data for 1964 show for each $100 of
average outstanding credit a gross income of $21.40, expenses includ-
ing income taxes of $19.07, and a net profit of $2.33. The average
net return of 8.7 per cent on total assets and thirteen per cent on
equity funds in 196462 was certainly not excessive, considering the
nature of the industry. To many, this twenty-one per cent average
rate will still seem too high. Much of the loss and collection expense
on consumer loans comes from job loss or severe medical problems.6"
Perhaps in the better world of the future, private and social insurance
will so reduce the need for the high risk, high interest rate loans and
the losses and collection expenses on consumer loans that lower interest
rates will be possible.
CREST AND THE 1963 GENERAL USURY STATUTE
The general usury provisions in Article 49 were amended in 1963
by adding Section 1A:64
Except in the case of loans secured by a mortgage or deed of
trust on real property, interest computed on the principal amount
of a loan at a rate permitted by § 1 [6%] of this article may be
charged or deducted in advance where the borrower is required
to repay the indebtedness in equal or substantially equal monthly,
or other periodic installments.
As a later passed statute, it may be assumed that this provision will
take precedence over Section 22 of Article 58A so that real estate loans
are limited to six per cent interest on the declining balance. As Section
1A says nothing about investigation fees, and in view of the tendency
of the court of appeals to minimize the effect of limitations on interest
charges, it may be that the grant of the power to charge four per cent or
two per cent fees for investigation will be held to survive the enactment
of Section IA. Such a result would be warmly received by those lend-
ing money on real estate mortgages.65 As to the allowable method of
60. Ch. 589, § 132A, [1967] Laws of Maryland 775.
61. Smith, Recent Trends in the Financial Position of Nine Major Consumer
Finance Companies, in J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY:
ITS COSTS AND REGULATION 38 (1967).
62. Id. at 48.
63. Siporin, Bankrupt Debtors and Their Families, 12 SOCIAL WORK 51, 57 (1967).
64. MD. CODE ANN. art. 49, § 1A (1964 repl. Vol.).
65. Prior to the Crest decision, whether points were charged to the mortgagor or
to the vendor, they apparently could lead to a defense of usury. Glass v. Third Nat'l
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 156 Md. 26, 143 A. 587 (1928) ; Real Estate Trustee v. Rebhan,
153 Md. 624, 139 A. 351 (1927). The charging of three points is reportedly common
today in Maryland. Two points on a twenty year loan would produce a true interest
rate of about 6.3%. The Fed. Home Loan Bank Board estimate of interest on con-
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computing and charging interest, it would seem to be much easier to
arrive at the rule of the Crest case under the Section 1A language,
"interest computed on the principal amount of a loan . . . may be
charged or deducted in advance" than it was for the court under the
Section 22 language, "on the principal amount of the loan, in advance."
The language "charged or deducted" first appeared in the 1860
codification of Section 1 of Article 49.6 This provision was introduced
by the Act of 1826 which legalized all "discounts" theretofore made
by banks and allowed interest to be "calculated or deducted" according
to the interest tables of Rowlett.67 An Act of 1830 extended this per-
mission to all lenders.6 8 To repeat, the simplest discount would be to
loan $100 at six per cent for one year, advancing only $94 to the
borrower, with the true interest rate being something more than six
per cent. The Report of the Governor's Commission to study Article 49
in December, 1962, stated:
The Commission is informed that the legality of the banking
practice of discounting of loans in advance is a troublesome prob-
lem that should be resolved. The Deputy Bank Commissioner,
the Maryland Bankers' Association and the mortgage bankers all
endorse the request for legal clarification of the practice.69
In view of the statutory history, it is difficult to locate the source
of doubt. Discounting was clearly to be allowed. The unstated doubts
were possibly as to the discounting of installment loans and of loans
for more than the two-year time found in Rowlett.
If the law was unclear before the 1963 enactment of Section IA
and the legislature merely continued the old language, then prior to
Crest, but after 1963, the law was still unclear as to the legality of dis-
counting at the maximum legal rate. It is arguable that "charged or
deducted in advance" meant nothing more than the procedure which
was the subject of the 1957 Attorney General's report, namely first
adding the six per cent to the loan, then deducting it before determining
the amount to be disbursed to the borrower. Such an interpretation
would violate the commercial sense of the statute as well as its judicial
interpretation 7' and must be rejected. The argument that discounting
is not allowed on installment loans is expressly laid to rest by the new
Section IA. The two year Rowlett argument is still open, which would
mean limiting both Section 1 and Section 1A to loans for two years or
less, and finding the limit for longer term loans in Section 3 of Article
49.71 However, the argument is weak, for Section 1 is not obviously
ventional first mortgages, as reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, was 5.99%
plus 0.57 point in April, 1966 and 6.38% plus one point in April, 1967.
66. MD. CODi art. 95 (1860).
67. Ch. 99, [18261 Laws of Maryland.
68. Ch. 152, [1832] Laws of Maryland.
69. Report of the Governor's Commission to Study Article 49 of the Maryland
Code 14 (1962).
70. Duncan v. Md. Sav. Institution, 10 Gill & J. 299 (Md. 1838).
71. In a number of states, discounting is allowed but only on short term loans.
E.g., Agostini v. Colonial Trust Co., 28 Del. Ch. 30, 36 A.2d 33 (1944) ; Castleberry v.
Weil, 142 Ark. 627, 219 S.W. 739 (1920); 55 AM. JUR. Usury § 41 (1946).
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limited to two year loans, and the reference to real estate loans suggests
coverage of loans for longer terms.
The effect of discounting is rather small in short term loans. In
a future case involving a loan for a long term of years, the court of
appeals could reinterpret the facts in the Crest case so as to avoid the
decision, especially if the lender has been too rapacious. The 13.46
per cent charged by Crest was not substantially higher than the approxi-
mately eleven per cent it could have charged by simply computing in
advance without discounting, and is even closer to the approximately
twelve per cent it could have charged without discounting if it had
taken a fee for investigation. But in a case where the true interest rate
charged was, for example, forty per cent a year, it would be sound
jurisprudence for the court to say:
The Crest case involved a true loan of $14,500. This case
(hypothetical) involves only a loan of $10,000. That is all the
borrower asked for or thought he was getting. This is not a true
discount, but is a mere sham to avoid the usury statute. No more
than six per cent per year on the amount actually borrowed, com-
puted in advance, may be charged. Montague v. Sewell.
OTHER STATUTES
The Crest decision brings the general usury statute in line with
the practice as to loans from $300 to $1500. The Industrial Finance
Companies Act, which regulates such loans, allows licensees to "charge,
contract for or receive, interest, in advance at a rate not to exceed six
per cent per year . . . of the original principal amount of the loan or
advance .. ,"I In addition, charges in advance for services or ex-
penses are allowable at the rate of four per cent on loans up to $500
and two per cent on larger loans.73 As the phrase "principal amount
of the loan" is the same language as was applied in Crest, a good
argument can be made that the advance-discount method is allowable
under the Industrial Finance Companies Law. However, perhaps this
statute, on the theory that it is remedial legislation, is to be strictly
interpreted to protect the borrower. 4 Although the word "advance"
in the phrase "principal amount of the loan or advance" can be read
as indicating that the legislature intended the interest to be computed
on the amount of money actually advanced, not the face amount of an
add-on note, the permission to "receive, interest, in advance" fairly
supports the present regulatory interpretation allowing discounting."
72. MD. CODE ANN. art. 11, § 196(A) (1) (1957).
73. If Maryland companies want to engage in the business of lending $1,500 or less
without submitting to regulation under the Industrial Finance Companies Law, § 165
would prohibit any service fee charges, thus limiting the effective interest to twelve
per cent on one year loans, sixteen per cent on five year loans, and twenty-two per
cent on ten year loans.
74. 45 MD. ATT'Y GEN. Ops. 17 (1960). Such interpretation has also been called
liberal. Fisher v. Bethesda Discount Corp., 221 Md. 271, 275, 157 A.2d 265, 268 (1960).
75. The Industrial Finance Co. statutes of Hawaii and Utah have been so in-
terpreted. Carey v. Hilo Finance & Thrift Co., 170 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1948) (fifteen
month loan) ; Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. Varney, 75 Utah 355, 285 P. 304 (1930)
(ten month loan). But see note 39 supra.
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The 1964 act regulating the business of making loans for payment
of insurance premiums provides that one-half per cent for each thirty
days may be "charged in advance, upon the entire amount advanced,
payable in installments."7 This statute is rather similar to the Indus-
trial Finance Companies Act. However, because the interest is to be
charged on the "amount advanced," because the interest is arguably
to be payable in installments, and because the word "receive" does not
appear, discounting should not be allowed. As noted earlier, the term
"charged" was used in the 1860 codification of what is now Section 1
of Article 49 as a substitute for the term "calculated."
The Land Installment Contract Act is similar to the Retail Install-
ment Sales Act in that it requires a clear disclosure of the cash price,
additional charges, and the "principal balance" owed." But the limit
on interest is not in terms of the phrase "principal balance," as in
the sales act. Section 112(1) (h) speaks of "the interest on the un-
paid balance not to exceed six per cent per annum." Does this mean
the "unpaid balance" at the beginning, from year to year, or on each
payment date ? In view of the long term of the typical land install-
ment contract and the textual context, it is very doubtful that unpaid
balance means the principal balance plus the interest. Discounting should
not be allowed. On the other hand, simple six per cent on the declining
balance, the typical way of computing interest in real estate loans, may
be impractical. 79 One answer is that the parties may agree upon an in-
flated cash price, thus giving the vendor his appropriate return.
The new Secondary Mortgage Loan Law"0 allows a loan origina-
tion fee of no greater than two per cent of the net proceeds of the
loan and seems to set the interest rate at twelve per cent on the declin-
ing balance from time to time due. Thus it was probably intended to
limit the true interest to a little more than twelve per cent. However,
there is some possibility that interest may be discounted, the net pro-
ceeds due being after interest, so that the true allowable interest rate
may be much higher. Under this possibility, a loan of $1,000 for five
years would first be computed to bear $334.66 interest on the declining
balance at twelve per cent. Discounting, the net proceeds payable would
be $665.34. Then a two per cent origination fee of $13.31 could be
deducted, leaving $652.03 for the borrower, who signs a note for $1000.
The true annual interest rate would then be more than eighteen per
cent. The ambiguous Section 61 (a) reads as follows :"
A Lender may make a secondary mortgage loan in such an
amount that the net proceeds thereof shall equal a predetermined
sum, and may take interest in advance upon the full amount of
76. MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 486D (Supp. 1966).
77. MD. CODE ANN. art. 21, § 112 (1966 repl. vol.).
78. See the dissent of Judge Homey in Falcone v. Palmer Ford, 242 Md. 487,
500, 219 A.2d 808, 814 (1966) and cases in note 56 supra.
79. The national average interest charge on real estate mortgages is currently
greater than 6%. Investigation fees apparently cannot be charged. The service charges
allowed in § 112(1) (b) probably must be for actual services rendered to the pur-
chaser, not merely for making the loan. Cf. 45 MD. AT'y GEN. OPs. 9 (1960), finding
that a premium charge for an FHA guaranty of the loan was not additional interest.
80. Ch. 390, [1967] Laws of Maryland 783.
81. Ch. 390, § 61 (a), [1967] Laws of Maryland 789.
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such loan for the period from the making of the loan to the date
of maturity of the final installment. The total interest, however,
shall not exceed the amount that would accrue throughout the
term of the loan, if charged at the rate of 12 per cent per annum
at the end of each installment period upon the descending balance.
As the legislature did specify that the origination fee is to be charged
on the "net proceeds of the loan," but spoke only of the "descending
balance" when fixing the base for the twelve per cent interest rate, it is
not clear that the twelve per cent is to be computed on the descending
balance of the net proceeds.8 2 The first sentence certainly indicates
that the loan may be drawn up in an add-on or discount form, so that
the balance which would literally be due on the loan from month to
month would include both principal and interest. The legislature has
presented another difficult problem to the courts. Even if interest may
be charged on interest by the discount method, the 18.3% thus allow-
able on a five year loan is perhaps reasonable. But for ten years, the
amount advanced against a $1000 note would be only $272.19, with
true interest far exceeding the Small Loan Act limits.
The acts regulating the business of making loans less than $300,"8
credit unions,84 automobile sales,85 sales of consumer goods,8 6 and re-
volving retail credit 87 all seem to preclude the discount method. The
first two types of loans can only be made on a declining balance interest
basis. Automobile sales credit can be extended, under the Falcone case,
on the basis of interest computed in advance. However, we can only
be sure that automobile credit "interest" cannot be computed on an
advance-discount method if we read the definition of "principal balance"
into Section 132(b) of Article 83. The statute defines "principal
balance" as the amount due before adding the finance charge. Although
a necessary basis of the Falcone decision was that Section 132(b) was
a separate statute, the opinion makes it clear that the definitions in the
Retail Installment Sales Act (except the dollar limit) are applicable
to that section.
The permissible credit charges in Maryland are summarized in the
following table :88
82. Cf. 49 MD. ATV'Y GFN. Ops. 298 (1963) interpreting art. 58A, § 18, "If the
Legislature had intended to restrict this type of insurance to decreasing term insur-
ance, the limitation would have been clearly spelled out as an amount not to exceed
the amount of outstanding indebtedness or some such similar terminology."
83. MD. COD ANN. art. 58A, § 16 (1964 repl. vol.).
84. MD. CODx ANN. art. 11, § 153 (1957) ("one per cent. per month, on unpaid
balances").
85. MD. COng ANN. art. 83, § 132 (1965 repl. vol.).
86. Ch. 389, § 132A, [1967] Laws of Maryland 776.
87. Ch. 389, § 153D, [1967] Laws of Maryland 780. The new subtitle, Retail
Credit Accounts Law, contains its own definitions and allows computation of the
service charge on the cash price in advance, without discounting, or computation at
a higher apparent rate on the basis of the declining balance due.
88. The true annual rates have been rounded to the nearest full percentage point.
If the Industrial Finance Act is interpreted to further its purpose of protecting bor-
rowers, discounting is not allowed, and the permissible true rates for all amounts and
terms are less than twelve percent. The basis of these computations may be found in
the text, supra, accompanying and following these footnotes: Small Loans, note 83;
Industrial Finance, note 72; Credit Unions, note 84; Art. 49, note 64; Consumer






Small loans (up to $300)
Ind. Finance ($301-$1500)
Credit Unions















6% a year plus fees
1% a month
6% a year plus fees






























17% on 5 year
loan
24% on 10 year
loan
22% on 2 year
term
20% on 2 year
term
16% on 2 year
term
22% on 2 year
term






Land Installment Contracts, note 77; Second Mortgages, note 80; and Insurance
Premium Loans, note 76. The indicated maximum rate for credit unions is reportedly
not always honored in practice.
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Statute Nominal Rate True Annual Rate
Land Installment Contracts 6% 11% or possi-
bly 6%
Second mortgages 12% a year 12% on 5 year
plus 2 points loan or
18% on 5 year
loan
Insurance Premium Loans Y2 % per 30 days
plus $10 11% on large
amounts
CONCLUSION
In Falcone, Rothman, and Crest, the Maryland Court of Appeals
has either completely freed transactions from the limitations of the
usury statutes or has drastically limited any protection given by these
statutes. With our rapid communications, availability of alternative
sources of loans, and higher level of education, perhaps today there are
no sufficient policy reasons for limiting the interest which a party may
knowingly choose to pay. Perhaps various desirable lines of commerce
require interest rates beyond those nominally specified in the Mary-
land statutes. Such considerations may have been the unstated bases
of these decisions. If the court's decisions were so motivated, then
minimizing the protection of borrowers from usury is good law making,
for the court of appeals must constantly make policy and adjust the
meaning of statutes to the needs of the community. Professor Llewellyn,
in his climactic book, The Common Law Tradition, Deciding Appeals,
concludes his chapter on "Reckonability of Result: Sense and Reason
Again" with a discussion of a Cardozo decision and with this statement:
No, what we have is advocacy informing the court at the
appellate stage about wise choice of concept and consequent rule,
in view of the inherent needs of the type of situation; informing
so persuasively that the court turns its back on the plain text of
a statute to strong-arm an exception which the legislature has
lacked the knowledge and prudence to provide.8 9
Although the Maryland court has alleviated some of the pressure
for further legislative reform, credit regulations in this state are cer-
tainly in need of further reform. As has been seen, many of the statutes
are confused or ambiguous, and most encourage misleading of bor-
rowers. Moreover, the regulation is uneven and incomplete. A $300
loan may be made at thirty-six per cent a year, while a $400 loan can
be made at only twenty per cent for one year. Credit given for home
improvements or any services rendered should be regulated. Auto-
mobile credit, other sales credit and consumer loans should be placed
on a more equal footing. In view of these present deficiencies, the con-
89. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 212 (1960).
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sumer credit code being drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws is greatly needed in this state. Whether such legislation
should fix only high limits on interest, leaving the usual rates to be
adjusted by competition, or should set lower rates to be charged in the
typical case, will be one of the more difficult questions to resolve in
this area.90
90. The arguments for having only high limits are simply and forcefully stated
in Johnson, Effect of Personal Loan Rate Reduction on the Consumer, 17 PERSONAL
FINANCe L.Q. RFP. 46 (1962). However, a pattern of regulation similar to that in
Maryland is described in Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic
Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L. Rgv. 327, 332 (1967), as follows:
The effect of these statutes is to raise the legally permissible interest on many
kinds of loans far in excess of the six per cent rate which was retained as a
generally applicable limit. Such legislation is simply a surrender to the economic
laws which actually fix the price of credit, while allowing the legislature to retain
a pretense of regulation.
For a careful analysis concluding that rates, not just limits, should be set, see McEwen,
Economic Issues in State Regulation of Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rzv.
387, 402-06 (1967). For a thorough analysis of the need for much more regulation to
protect poor consumers, see Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE
L.J. 745 (1967).
